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ABSTRACT: this article argues that the relative absence of economic freedoms in the countries of the 
Muslim world can be explained by the history of Muslim law, and more particularly by its conception of 
property rights. It shows that the main obstacle to the emergence of private property has been the 
status of land, originating out of the domination of the first caliphates. It recalls the effects of formal 
inequalities between individuals (men – women, men – slaves, Muslims – non-Muslims) on the one 
hand, and the effects of property restrictions on economic development on the other, but maintains 
that the heart of the blockage lies in the legal status of land, a status which protects public ownership 
and even extends it to cover water rights. This encloses the economy in a philosophy of enrichment 
where the opportunities for profit are artificially created through the rents seized by the ruling class. 
The conclusion is devoted to the future of economic freedom in the Muslim world. 
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RESUME : Cet article soutient que la faiblesse des libertés économiques dans les pays de l’aire 
musulmane (1) s’explique par l’histoire du droit musulman et plus particulièrement sa conception des 
droits de propriété. Il montre que la principale résistance à l’avènement de la propriété privée fût le 
statut de la terre hérité de la domination des premiers califats. Il rappelle, d’une part, les effets des 
inégalités formelles entre les hommes (homme – femme, homme – esclave, musulman – non 
musulman) en droit musulman et, d’autre part, des restrictions sur la propriété sur le développement 
économique (2), mais soutient que le cœur du blocage est le statut juridique de la terre. Ce statut 
protège la propriété publique et l’étend à l’eau. Il enferme l’économie dans une logique 
d’enrichissement où les opportunités de profit sont artificiellement créées par les rentes saisies par la 
classe dirigeante (3). La conclusion est consacrée à l’avenir de la liberté économique dans cette aire 
(4). 
 
Mots clés : développement économique, droit de propriété, Islam et prédation 
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Economics is facing an ever-growing demand to explain the links between Islam and 
economic development. The terrorist attacks of September 2001, the failure of institutional 
reforms in Muslim countries and the Iranian revolution of 1979 are three events that 
contribute to this keen interest in the economics of religion, and of Islam in particular. The 
present article is part of this movement. It affirms that Islam has been a brake on 
development, but that it possesses the qualities necessary to invent a model of development 
wherein its values can be reconciled with those of a prosperous free-enterprise economy. It 
criticises both the studies that exonerate Islam from all responsibility in the institutional 
evolution of the Muslim lands and those that present the secularisation of society as the sole 
means of removing the socio-cultural barriers to development. Thus, it makes a clear 
distinction between the question of the emergence of institutions capable of safeguarding 
economic freedoms, and the question of their implementation within a non-Western culture. 
We do not deny the effects of European imperialism (Rodinson 1966/1973), geography 
(Diamond 1997, 2000) or the possession of important energy resources (Youssef 2004) on 
the differentials of development between the West and the East; we believe that Islam has 
mapped out the ethical path of institutions in Muslim countries, and in this regard it has 
provided fertile ground for the establishment of institutions that encourage unproductive 
activities (Facchini 2007). European imperialism may explain the low level of GDP per capita 
in countries of the Muslim world, but this does not allow us to exclude the cultural factor, and 
particularly its religious dimension. We therefore set out to show that religion has an effect on 
institutional choices because it has an effect on mentalities, on the economic and political 
beliefs of individuals and political decision-makers. By inventing institutions that safeguard 
economic freedoms, the Western model has caused other regions of the world to question 
their own models of development. In this sense, colonisation is not a cause, but rather a 
consequence of the military and economic decline of the Arab and then the Ottoman 
empires. The state management of energy resources is also a consequence rather than a 
cause of the authoritarian political regimes that govern Muslim countries. Subsequently, of 
course, oil revenues help these regimes to maintain stability through the classic mechanisms 
of redistribution. Geography certainly limits the choices of a country, but it does not dictate its 
moral code. 
 
Several works and types of arguments could dissuade us from this culturalist thesis. The first 
is the work of Rodinson (1966 p. 47, 1973), who asserts that Islam is no hindrance to the 
development of capitalist-type relations. Jomo (1977, p. 243) furthered this thesis, rightly 
observing that we cannot know whether Islam would not have adopted capitalism, if there 
had been no European colonisation. The second argument is based on the fact that the 
Prophet was originally a trader. Surely a former trader could not be unfavourable to the 
market. This argument is supported, for example, by the fact that the Muslim civilisation 
under the Abbasside dynasty (around 820 of the Christian era) was founded on great cities, 
opulent courts and a system of long routes of communication by land, sea and river (Elisseeff 
1977, p. 312). The third is the argument that Islam does recognise and protect private 
property (Habachy 1962), and that the only difference between the West and the East lies in 
the foundations of property. According to this argument, property has secular foundations in 
the West, whereas it has religious foundations in the East (Habachy 1962, p. 453). 
Consequently, the hostility of Muslim countries towards private property can be explained by 
the socialism that filtered into Muslim countries when they gained independence (Habachy 
1962, p. 472). The fourth is the recent publication of two articles maintaining that the variable 
“Islam” is not significant (Noland 2007, Pryor 2007). Noland (2007) asserts that the variable 
“percentage of Muslim population of a country” does not explain growth differentials between 
countries; on the contrary, it has a positive and significant effect on growth when the sample 
consists exclusively of developing countries (Noland 2007). The econometrician concludes 
that religious sociology is less useful than Solow’s model and its derivatives for explaining 
the particular growth of countries in the Muslim world. Pryor (2007) defends a similar idea by 
showing, on the basis of multifactorial analysis, that there is no Muslim institutional model, 
and that when the sample only comprises developing countries from which Muslim countries 
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that are too small or too rich (from oil resources) are excluded, the religious variable 
(percentage of Muslim population) does not explain the economic performances of different 
countries.  
 
The object of this article is not to discuss the limitations of these analyses, but to describe the 
ethical path followed by formal institutions in the Muslim world. We agree, on this point, with 
J-P. Platteau (2006, p. 2) that more can be learned about the influence of Islam on economic 
development through historical investigation than through cross-sectional analysis. Without 
wishing to prejudge future econometric results, we believe it is difficult to deny that Islam has, 
to varying degrees, shaped the ethical path of institutions in Muslim countries. This historical 
point is indisputable, and provides us with a firm basis on which to extend the approach 
proposed by Kuran (1997), Nafissi (1998) or Voigt (2005), by affirming that religion in 
general, and Islam in particular, has had and still has an effect on development, through the 
constraints it imposes on institutional choices. This does not exclude the direct influence of 
religion on economic behaviour (employment for women, fatalism, spirit of enterprise, taste 
for accumulation and hoarding, etc.) (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2003) or the role played 
by colonisation and geographic factors, but it does lead us to attach greater importance to 
the ethical dimension.  
 
This article maintains that the relative absence of economic freedoms in the countries of the 
Muslim world (part 1) can be explained by the history of Muslim law, and more particularly by 
its conception of property rights. It shows that the main obstacle to the emergence of private 
property has been the status of land, a status inherited from the domination of the first 
caliphates. It describes the effects of formal inequalities between individuals (men – women, 
men – slaves, Muslims – non-Muslims) on the one hand, and the effects of property 
restrictions on economic development on the other (part 2), but maintains that the heart of 
the blockage lies in the legal status of land. This status protects public ownership and 
extends it to water rights. It encloses the economy in a philosophy of enrichment where the 
opportunities for profit are artificially created by the rents seized by the ruling class (part 3). 
The conclusion is devoted to the future of economic freedom in these countries (part 4). 
 
1. Muslim countries and economic freedom 
 
The countries of the Muslim world have neither political nor economic freedom, and are 
currently undergoing a severe economic crisis. The countries of North Africa and the Middle 
East, after having enjoyed very strong growth rates from 1960 to 1980, entered into crisis in 
1980, with average growth rates of 1% for the area as a whole. This stands in striking 
contrast to the countries of South-East Asia for example, or even Latin America, which 
recorded an average growth rate of 2.7% between 1990 and 2000 (more than three times 
higher than the average for the Middle East over the same period). The economic stagnation 
of the 1980s in most countries of the Muslim world and the Middle East (Youssef 2004), the 
low GDP per capita (excluding oil-producing countries), the fact that Muslim countries 
currently have lower GDP per capita than neighbouring non-Muslim countries with 
comparable levels of natural resources (Spain, Italy, Greece, etc.) (Hillman (2007, p. 264), 
and low productivity levels (UNDP 2002) suggest that the economic problems facing these 
countries may be explained in terms of one of the main features they have in common: Islam. 
Logically, this explanation takes on even more significance for the countries at the heart of 
Islam (Arab countries) than for the others. 
 
These economic difficulties can be explained by low levels of economic freedom. It is widely 
acknowledged that economic freedom is a necessary condition to economic development. 
Figure 1 gives a first illustration of the positive, significant relation between growth and 
economic freedom. It summarises, in the form of a graph, the primacy of the quality of 
institutions over all the other causes of under-development. The principal source of under-
development is poor institutional design.  
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Good institutions are ones that secure the private property rights of merchants (North and 
Thomas 1980, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, or de Soto 2005). The private ownership of 
capital is a condition of economic calculation (Mises 1949, pp. 211-212). It provides security 
for investments by protecting entrepreneurs from expropriation (predation) (Hayek 1976, 
1982, p. 16, Dawson 1998, Besley 1995) and is a necessary condition of contractual freedom 
(Kirzner 1992, pp. 51-54). Conversely, public ownership and the abuse of power over private 
owners harm development by directing resources towards unproductive activities. Agents do 
not abandon enterprise, but they turn away from the search for profit. They seek to use the 
force of the State to obtain privileges, in other words to modify the structure of rights to their 
advantage. The opportunity to act in such a way diverts entrepreneurs from the market and 
turns them into political entrepreneurs (i.e. predators). Their objective is no longer to create 
wealth, but to acquire control over existing wealth. 
 
Voigt (2005, p. 65) has calculated the average index of economic freedom for countries in 
the Muslim world, on the basis of a report by Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2002). This 
index ranks countries on a scale from 1 (not free) to 10 (free). The average score of Muslim 
countries is 5.7, compared with an average for the whole sample of 6.32. Figures 2A and 2B  
also demonstrate the relatively low indices of economic freedom in the countries of the 
Muslim world. These figures show that on average, despite the communist period in Central 
and Eastern Europe, European countries have higher indices of economic freedom than 
Islamic countries. Scully had already remarked on this fact in 1987. He observed that 
countries with Islamic law had lower indices of civil liberty than Christian countries in general 
and Protestant countries in particular.  
 
Figure 1: Correlation between GDP (PPP US$) per capita in 2000 and the square of the 
average EFW rating 1980 – 2000. Source: www.cato.org/pub Economic Freedom of the 
World 2004 Annual Report by James Gwartney and Robert Lawson (Chapter 2). (For the 
countries listed and more details, see the report). 
 
R2 = 64.0 
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Figure 2: Comparison of the correlation between the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom and GDP per capita for the countries of North Africa and the Middle East 
(A) and Europe (B).  
Source: 2007 Index of Economic Freedom, www.heritage.org/index/ 
 
2A 
GDP per capita 2006 (www.cia.org) 
 
2007 Index of Economic Freedom 
     
2B 
GDP per capita 2006 (www.cia .org) 
 
                      2007 Index of Economic Freedom           
 
These low scores for economic freedom are compounded by high levels of corruption. Figure 3 
shows that corruption (as measured by the Transparency International Index) is negatively and 
significantly correlated to economic growth. Statistically, Muslim countries are poorer and more 
corrupt than non-Muslim countries (Paldam 2001, p. 404). Like the Roman Catholic church, and 
unlike Protestant and tribal religions, Islam is positively and significantly correlated to corruption, 
although this does not mean that it is the root cause. 
 
Figure 3: Corruption and growth in 97 countries for 1997. Source: Tanzi and Davoodi (2000). 
 
Growth in GDP per capita 1997 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
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2 Islamic law and private property 
 
The relative under-development and low growth rates of the Muslim world can be explained in 
terms of its institutional failures. It has been argued that the origin of these failures lies in a 
politico-economic equilibrium favourable to the status quo and unfavourable to institutional 
reform. According to this theory, religion is exploited by the ruling class. It does not play a full-
fledged role, serving rather as a form of window-dressing.  
 
We do not share this view, which leaves no room for axiological rationality in its explanation, 
focusing exclusively on the instrumental dimension of rationality. When a head of government 
believes in the precepts of Islam, he does not act solely out of self-interest (a consequentialist 
ethic), but also by conviction. Islam is the ethical path of the institutions of countries in the 
Muslim world. It explains the past trajectory, the difficulties encountered by colonisers and the 
nature of the reforms undertaken by governments upon accession to independence. We 
therefore adopt an institutionalist perspective in our reflection. The institutional design of 
countries in the Muslim world has been shaped above all by Islamic law, derived from the sacred 
texts. Kuran has devoted several articles to this subject.  
 
From a general point of view, Islamic law recognises public and private human rights (Khadduri 
1946, pp. 77-78). Private rights concern individuals in the community, while public rights concern 
the Muslim community itself. As in the Judeo-Christian tradition, property law is founded on the 
Divine Creation. God is the owner of everything because he is the Creator of everything. 
“Absolutely, to God belongs everything in the heavens and the earth…” (Sura 24, verse 64). 
However, the Koran says nothing very precise about individual property. This law derives rather 
from the Sunna, in other words from the tradition and rules of custom existing in the conquered 
countries. It is acknowledged, on the basis of these sacred texts, that the protection of property 
is very marked in Islamic law (Schacht 1964, 1999, p. 118).  
 
Islamic law stemming from the interpretation of sacred texts can be distinguished from the 
Western model, however, by the fact that it restricts the freedoms and prerogatives of the owner 
on several points (2.1), that it does not establish formal equality before the law (2.2) and that it 
pronounces on the spoils of war, in other words it legitimises predation (2.3). This last 
characteristic appears to us decisive in explaining socio-legal resistance to economic freedom. 
Taken together, these three characteristics refute the argument that socialism is responsible for 
leading Muslim countries to renounce private property. The reason is more profound, and 
founded in principles deriving from Islamic law. 
 
 2.1 Restricted property rights 
 
Individual freedoms, in other words the use of one’s property, are limited by the prohibition of 
usury1, the obligation to give legal alms, inheritance law2, the absence of juridical personality, 
collective lands, the State’s right of eminent domain over the land and the prohibition against the 
appropriation of water and pasture (Rodinson 1966, p. 30). All these restrictions have 
contributed to the formation of institutions quite distinct from those of the free market.  
 
1
 Islamic finance is based on the prohibition against usury or riba, identified with the loan interest practised 
by banks; the sharing of profits and losses between an entrepreneur who borrows and his lender; the 
prohibition against the funding of forbidden activities such as gambling, etc. Rather than lending money for 
someone to buy a house, the bank buys the house and rents it out. 
2
 Europe has not experienced this ethical path of the law because the Bible lays down no precise rules 
about inheritance (Kuran 2004, p. 75). See: Durand B. (1991). 
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The prohibition on lending with interest has been circumvented, but it continues to inspire Islamic 
finance. The rejection of interest deprives individuals of a synthetic indicator of the temporal 
preferences of agents and hinders the intertemporal coordination of supply and demand. Legal 
alms-giving justifies redistribution, strengthens the requirement for distributive justice, condemns 
inegalitarian societies and paves the way for Arab socialism. Inheritance law favours the 
indivision of Muslim lands, i.e. “legal situations where at least two people share rights of the 
same nature over one same good or over one same set of goods, without there being any 
material division of their shares” and insecurity as regards the lands of non-Muslims. Indivision 
limits the concentration of wealth. More generally, it threatens the succession of firms and capital 
from one generation to the next (Kuran 2004). It has had the same effect as the civil code had 
on the parcelling-out of lands in France. Islamic inheritance law has fragmented fortunes and 
has had the unintentional effect of limiting innovation (Kuran 2003, 2004, p. 75). It has 
strengthened the effect of the absence of juridical personality on the dynamic of accumulation in 
Muslim lands. The absence of juridical personality has prevented the emergence of collective 
enterprises with legal rights distinct from those of the individuals who finance them, i.e. 
corporations. Kuran uses this to explain why finance in the Middle East before the year 1000 
operated without banks and without credit markets in the modern sense of the term. Uncertainty 
about the legitimacy of interest and the lack of corporate law has resulted in contracts where the 
borrowers and lenders are individuals (Kuran 2004, p. 73). This has also had the effect of 
limiting investment and, ultimately, innovation and growth. The rigidity of Islamic law has 
prevented countries subject to it from developing large-scale businesses capable of taking 
advantage of economies of scale and of developing new technologies. The effects of collective, 
joint and State property will be examined in more detail in the third section of this article. 
 
 2.2 Unequal property rights 
 
To these restrictions, we must add the fact that Islamic law does not establish formal equality 
before the law; it simply endorses the inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims, men and 
women, free men and slaves. Although it is true that everyone living in the Muslim world has the 
right to life and safety, to respect of their reputation and to equal justice, these rights are above 
all vouchsafed to Muslims. Full human rights, and property rights in particular, are only 
recognised for free Muslims. In Islamic law, human rights are not conferred on everyone in the 
same way. To obtain property rights, one must be adult, free and of the Islamic faith (Khadduri 
1946, p. 79). This means that the rights of Muslims are more secure than those of slaves or non-
Muslims. Three social inequalities have been sanctified by holy writ (Voigt 2005, p.65): the 
relation between master and slave, the relationship between man and woman and the 
relationship between believer and unbeliever. The slavery breaks human right. There is 
underinvestment in women’s human capital. And part of the population is therefore deprived of 
the stable rules of law favourable to investment (Voigt 2005, p. 66).  
 
This moral difference between Muslim and no Muslim  strengths also the homogeneous groups 
like Jews or Christians and discrimination. By means of discrimination, Islamic law creates 
advantages that are only accessible to Muslims. The tolerance shown towards the Christian and 
Jewish communities enabled them to organise themselves and create their own club goods. An 
ethnically homogeneous groups explains the low level of transaction costs within the group: 
Italian mafia, the economic success of Indians in East Africa, Syrians in West Africa, Lebanese 
in North Africa, Jews in Europe in the Middle Ages and Florentine merchants in the Florentine 
banking system in Europe. Belonging to a group is equivalent to having citizen’s rights. It gives 
members privileged access to markets and professions, but access to the group is not open to 
everyone. From this perspective, codes of ethics are interpreted as the functional equivalent of 
the Law Merchant or modern contractual law (Landa 1981, p. 357). In the absence of formal 
laws governing contracts, merchants customise or particularise their trade relations in such a 
way as to limit contractual uncertainty and reduce transaction costs.  
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The co-existence of different religious communities became a source of mutual gains. Each 
community secured its contracts in the absence of formal contractual rights. This co-existence 
can be explained by the Koranic principle of tolerance and by the beneficial consequences of 
this principle for the public finances of the Empire. Eliana Bella (2004) advances the second of 
these reasons to explain why Muslim authorities have always maintained ambiguous relations 
with Christians and Jews. As a State, the Ottoman Empire respected free trade and the religions 
of the book because Muslims were the cornerstone of the finances of the warrior empire. Non-
Muslims were prepared to pay for the right to practise their religion by paying taxes; in 
exchange, they were afforded not only protection, but also aids to help maintain their churches 
or synagogues. According to Bella (2004), these aids served to discourage Jews and Christians 
from converting to Islam.  
 
We can, however, put forward another reason to explain why so few People of the Book living in 
Muslim lands converted to Islam. Admittedly, they paid more taxes than Muslims, but they could 
organise themselves to produce their own specific club goods, like the Chinese communities in 
Malaysia described Carr and Landa (1983, pp. 154 – 155). They had no interest in breaking with 
their communities, because converts to another religion are always treated with suspicion. The 
costs of conversion are non-null. There is suspicion both from unconverted Christians and Jews 
and from Arab Muslims. In addition to the axiological rationality that guides behaviour, it was not 
necessarily in the interests of Jews and Christians to convert even from a viewpoint of strict 
instrumental rationality. The interest of non-Muslims, and Jews in particular, has been described 
by Grief (1989, 1993). Grief (1989) takes as his point of departure the idea that the intensity of 
exchanges depends on merchants’ ability to secure their sales in distant territories without 
having to travel themselves, while still respecting the principle that the merchandise can only be 
sold when it has reached its destination. But there are risks involved in delegating the sale of 
one’s goods to strangers. One group of merchants solved this problem by forming a network. 
These were the “Maghribi traders”, for the most part Jewish, who had started to spread through 
the whole Mediterranean basin from the city of Baghdad in the middle of the 10th century (Grief 
1989, p. 861 et sec.). By uniting, they found they could limit the problems of information 
asymmetry and organise the punishment of dishonest individuals within their community, thus 
contributing to the emergence of reputations. In this way, they reduced transaction costs. They 
probably succeeded in becoming richer as Jews in a Muslim country than they could have 
become as Muslim converts. 
 
Lewer and Van Den Berg (2007) draw on Grief’s work to advance the hypothesis that religion 
favours international trade through network effects. Alongside the variables of geographic 
proximity and demographic importance, they add a ‘religion’ variable to explain exchanges 
between two territorial zones. Networks encourage trust and favour exchange, but they can also 
work negatively if they prevent exchange between strangers. The emergence of a secular 
merchant community makes exchange more impersonal and consequently mitigates this 
restrictive effect of religion. So non-Muslims contributed all the more actively to the empire’s 
wealth as they overcame the insecurity of long-distance exchange through the formation of a 
network in which religious affiliation was the common denominator. 
 
 2.3 Law that pronounces on the spoils of war and legitimises predation 
 
The other characteristic of this law is that it pronounces on the spoils of war. Man can acquire 
property through conquest and plunder. “What God gave as spoils to His Messenger from the 
people of the cities is God’s, and the Messenger’s, and for kinsfolk, orphans, and the poor, and 
the wayfarer...” (Sura 59, verse 7, The Koran). Here, moveable goods are not the primary object 
of plunder. Immoveable goods, such as land, can also be appropriated. This legal ruling on 
plunder plays an important role in reconciling two apparently contradictory facts. On the one 
hand, it is clear that Arab-Muslim empires were rich, that trade flourished, that the souk was the 
heart of their cities and that merchants occupied an important position in them, the Koran having 
been revealed to a trading people. On the other hand, the economy of these empires was largely 
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founded on predation, in other words conquest and colonisation. The merchants of the imperial 
cities seized the artificial opportunities for profit created by conquests. These opportunities were 
artificial in that they derived from an economy of predation rather than an economy of 
production. The triumph of trade and the wealth of traders depended essentially on the spending 
of plunder acquired by the aristocracy, in other words the occupying power. This Muslim 
aristocracy extracted substantial income from the system of land taxation that it had established. 
It embodied the power of landowners (Benabdelali 1999, p. 183 and p. 275) living on the 
revenues from their land and imposing on society the dominant values of generosity and giving 
that were contrary to capitalism’s values of frugality and efficiency (Benabdelali 1999). Through 
their social domination over the merchants, the aristocrats maintained a gift economy that 
recycled agricultural surpluses and nurtured a flourishing urban productive sector (Benabdelali 
1999, p. 307). For these three reasons, land law is very important in helping to understand and 
describe the effect of Islam on institutional choices and more particularly on private property, 
because land was the main source of revenue for the Arab elite. It is all the more important when 
we take two other facts into consideration: the key role played by the enclosure movement in the 
emergence of English capitalism and the first industrial revolution on the one hand, and the 
importance of the farming economy in countries of the Muslim world on the other. Consequently, 
the protection of property can be very marked in Islamic law (Schacht 1964, 1999, p. 118) and 
yet not lead to the invention of institutions that safeguard economic freedoms.  
 
The phenomenon of State ownership derived at least partly from this history, blocking the 
introduction of economic freedoms and preventing the spread of private property in domains as 
important as farming, water or the exploitation of oil reservoirs. 
 
3 Land ownership in Muslim law limits privatization of natural resources 
 
In Islamic law, the land is sacred and managed by the owners, who have a duty of equity. Sura 
59, verse 7 of the Koran is often quoted to recall that land is not a definitively-acquired good 
when the threshold of self-sufficiency has been crossed and it runs the risk of lying fallow, 
becoming a tool of exploitation or being transmitted by unique inheritance. However, it should 
not be supposed that the status of land is the same throughout the Muslim world, for it has 
evolved not only with the revelation of the prophet and his conquests, but also more recently 
with European colonisation. It is difficult to say what Islamic land law would have been in the 
absence of European intervention. We can, nevertheless, draw on the sacred texts and the 
history of the first Caliphates to sketch the broad outlines of the ethical path of land law in the 
Muslim world. 
 
 3.1 Land ownership, predation and the tragedy of free access 
 
As we mentioned above, there is no unique land law in the Muslim world, but the sacred texts 
and the political unity arising out of the military conquests of the first Caliphates does provide 
Islamic land law with a general coherence (De Bellefonds 1959). Before the advent of Islam, 
each country had its own rules. After Islam, land became the eminent domain of the State and 
the main tool for the enrichment of the Islamic aristocracy of the State.  
 
The first form of property was that owned by the State. During the first Caliphates, it was 
constituted of the lands possessed by those who had fought against Islam. The State (the 
Caliph) had the right to appropriate one fifth of the spoils of conquest, and therefore of the 
occupied lands.  
 
The second form of property was that owned by conquering Arabs and non-Arabs (as in Iran) 
who had adopted Islam as their religion. These owners had to pay a tax called the Zakat, which 
represented 2.5% of the goods, destined for the poor.  
 
François Facchini, 1° Workshop of the European Network on the Economics of Religion (ENER)  
in Granada, Spain, 16 – 17 November 2007 JEL Classification : KOO, N23 
  
The third form of property was that of non-Muslims. This was the most profitable for the political 
authorities, because the owners had to pay not only the Zakat, but also the Kharaj (tax destined 
for the State, calculated on the basis of the area farmed). Thus, non-Muslims had to pay the 
Zakat, the Kharaj3 and an annual poll tax (the Jazieh). They were the largest source of revenue 
for the State and the Muslim aristocracy. Non-Muslims did not have the same rights as Muslims, 
as we explained above. They did not have the same freedom to use their income as Muslim 
owners, soldiers, officials, etc.  
 
The fourth form of property was that arising out of Waqf, in other words lands given to religious 
institutions and charities. These lands were partly or totally exempt from taxes.  
 
The fifth form of property was that of collective ownership by Muslims. The existence of 
collective or common ownership, the extent of which is difficult to ascertain for periods in the 
distant past, and sometimes even for the current day, can be explained by two major 
hadith4, and one of lesser importance (De Bellefonds 1959, p. 121). The first says that according 
to the Prophet: “Muslims have common share in three things: pasture, water and firewood”. The 
second says: “There is no hima (private pasturage) except that of Allah and His Messenger”. 
The third says: “Do not withhold excess water, preventing others from obtaining extra pasturage 
through it”. The commentators define pasture as plants that have grown spontaneously. This 
excludes cultures in which work has been invested. The majority of them then accept that a 
certain category of inhabitant (the messengers of God) can have exclusive rights over the 
common pasturages. The third hadith has led some theologians to maintain that each person 
has the right to take possession of the plants growing on other people’s land and to pasture their 
herds on them (De Bellefonds 1959, p. 131). The extent of these common lands depends, in 
practical terms, on tradition, for the Sharia says nothing on this point (De Bellefonds 1959, p. 
126). The inappropriable character of certain land “does not derive from its intrinsic nature (as 
there are private pasturages and appropriated forests), but from the principle, consecrated by 
the Sunna, that certain goods are a gift of God to which, as a consequence, everyone has an 
equal right” (De Bellefonds 1959, p. 123). Such lands have become, definitively, res communes. 
They can no longer become somebody’s property.  
 
In all these forms, land remained the eminent domain of the State, and the owner had usufruct. 
He could sell, rent or mortgage the land, but he could not bequeath it by will. A father without 
sons, for example, would see his land pass to the State.  
 
The first and third form of property shows the importance of spoil in the economy of the Arab-
Muslim empires and strengthens the argument propounded above. It also explains why no 
Muslim owners invested so little in their lands. State property limits transferability and 
competition around the useless of land. It is, for this reason, that this form of property is less 
efficiency than private property. Owners of state seek to maximise their rent, but they are in 
position of legal monopoly and can use the violence if the level of rent is too low. The tax on no 
Muslim’s land property explain underinvestment and mistrust between Muslim and no Muslim. It 
is the classical effects of tax. The second form is classical and efficiency. The consequences of 
the fourth form (Waqf) has been analyse by Kuran and Shatzmiller (2001). The Waqf prevents 
accumulation and immobilizes the land ressources. The firth form is common. Res communes 
engenders a risk of destruction of natural pastures and the forest heritage (De Bellefonds 1959, 
p. 114). Standard economic theory provides a perfect explanation for this phenomenon in the 
form of Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”, more precisely described, in this case, as a tragedy 
of free access. Logically, free access leads each user to exploit a common good until there is 
3
 According to Noël J. Coulson (1964, 1995, p. 25) it was Umar, one of the four companions of the 
Prophet, who defined Islamic public finances and the land tax (Kharäj) on the occupier, thus inaugurating 
a new status for the land. 
4
 The hadîth are collections of texts that retrace the words or deeds of Muhammad, currently said to form 
the Sunna (“tradition”). 
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nothing left. If a good has no price, because there are no property rights over it, individuals 
cannot express their preferences and construct a market. With zero prices, demand is never 
satisfied. This is nothing more than the strict application of the law of supply and demand. 
 
The tragedy of free access existed not only for common lands, but also for the other non-
appropriable goods: water, pasture and firewood, and also oil reserves or salt-marshes.  
 
 3.2 Ownership of water and the tragedy of common pasture 
 
As is the case for land, the Koran is not very precise about the ownership of water. It simply 
gives certain orientations and indications.  
 
Dante A. Caponera (1973, 2003) deals specifically with the evolution of water rights in Muslim 
lands. He notes that before the Prophet, there was no regulation. The whole tribe or the 
individual whose ancestors had dug the well became the owners, and they then exacted a fee 
from the people or tribes who wanted water for themselves or their animals. In the south of 
Arabia, the selling of water was current practice. However, when water was less abundant, it 
became the object of bloody conflicts in which the law of the strongest prevailed. God, through 
the mouth of the Prophet, declared that access to water was a right. The policy that arose out of 
God’s revelations to the Prophet was based on the principle that no one could monopolise water 
for themselves alone. The intention was to ensure access to water for the greatest number. This 
explains why, according to Islam, water resources are public property (belonging either to the 
State or in the public domain). To use water, one must first obtain a concession or licence from 
the public administration, and then one must request an opinion from the same administration 
before fixing a price or selling water or irrigation rights. Legal traditions are then more or less 
favourable to the sale of water or of irrigation rights, but only once authorisation has been 
obtained to commercialise water.  
 
This brief history of water and land law in Muslim countries leads us to make two observations. 
This is not libertarian law, closer to the rules before the revelation of the Prophet (the right of the 
first occupier and of those who have performed the work). The institution of a license to use 
water, for example, is a source of corruption and diverges from the principle of exclusivity that 
governs over the private property and economic calculations of the market economy.  
 
More generally, and in the light of these developments over land and water rights, it appears that 
Islamic practice and law are unfavourable to the privatisation of resources and the 
individualisation of rights. For this reason, they have acted as obstacles to the good use of rare 
resources, because they have prevented the emergence of institutions capable of establishing a 
market for water or land. They have favoured the disinterest of owners for the improvement of 
their capital. They have given to the State, as usufructuary, a role that has placed the owner in a 
position of legal insecurity and income-sharing. They have prevented evolution of the law 
towards more liberal forms because they have legitimised it by the word of God, which cannot be 
brought into question. They have perpetuated the economy of rent or plunder up to the present 
day. Such institutions have diverted entrepreneurs from productive activity, favoured 
unproductive activity and the corruption of economic mores. By pronouncing on land rights, 
Islamic law has favoured practices contrary to the word of the Prophet by encouraging the 
payment of bribes to seize artificially created profit opportunities, in other words to gain access 
to markets controlled by the aristocrats or politico-financial elites of the country. By founding law 
on the word of God, Islam has therefore prioritized morals over efficiency, ultimately harming 
good business morality. We can then conclude, with Voigt (2005, p. 66) that by making these 
goods inalienable, Islamic law pronounced their public exploitation by numerous Muslim States. 
Islamic law does not, therefore, naturally set these countries on the path towards the 
privatisation of natural resources and oil revenue. It pronounced the shift from the spoils of war 
to exploitation of the income from the production of oil or gas.  
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For all these reasons, it is difficult to deny the role of Islam in the institutional situation of Muslim 
countries. This does not exclude the possibility of a strong paradigmatic or ideological crisis in 
both domains. In Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, the absence of a solution 
generates crises and changes in normal beliefs, in other words the secularisation, 
Christianisation, Hinduisation and/or any other form of conversion. This is the supreme risk for 
the Muslim world, which has, ever since its inception, seen itself as a religion threatened by non-
believers, hypocrites, infidels and/or crusaders. This risk is clearly perceived by Muslim 
intellectuals (Kuran 1997a) and Muslims in general,5 who seek solutions that safeguard their 
values, their civilisation, their belief in God and in His word. There is indeed, therefore, a 
religious obstacle to economic freedom in the Muslim world (of varying importance depending on 
the countries). Such an obstacle is not necessarily insurmountable, but it would be unwise to 
deny its existence if we wish fully to understand the absence of institutions or institutional reform. 
Islamic law is not a rule like an other. It is the holy writ and nobody after the prophet have haven 
revelation. God does not speak after him. So, Islamic law is the origin of institutions in Muslim 
countries and it creates an institutional path dependency. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
In the light of the history of Islamic law and its economic consequences, we believe that it is fair 
to maintain that Islam has been an obstacle to the discovery of the right institutions for the 
economic development of the Muslim world. The institutions of Muslim countries are not the fruit 
of chance, but of Islam. This thesis explains why all the debates over institutional issues, even in 
international organisations, raise the question of the compatibility of institutional reforms with the 
sacred texts and tradition. When faced with the over-use of common pastures and its effects on 
the spread of desert zones, with the ever-growing need for clean water (Faruqui et al. 2003), 
with the parcelling-out of lands and women’s land rights (UN Habitat 2005), or with financial and 
economic questions (Beaugé 2005), the first thing the experts seek to determine, even before 
looking at scientific evidence, is what tradition and the sacred texts have to say. In this sense, 
the most important characteristic of the Muslim world is that it has remained faithful to its 
religion; whatever the problem, it seeks a solution in harmony with its belief of the words of God 
revealed to the Prophet. 
 
This thesis explains also why we think that it would be wrong to reduce Islam to a simple tool at 
the service of the power firstly of the Caliphs and then of more or less secular governments. 
Islam is not only a tool for political power. Firstly, we can not use a western concept to analyse 
an institutional reality which ignores the separation between spiritual and political power. The 
differentiation between temporal order and celestial order was born out the first Christians’ 
suspicion of and hostility towards the public sphere as such. They did not claim power, but the 
right not to participate in government and to work for their eternal salvation (Tierney 1982, 1993, 
p.140). Islam has a different tradition. There is not separation between spiritual and temporal 
because the state is submitted to the law of God. Here, the political power is an tool of spiritual 
power and not the contrary. So, the religion uses the politic and the politic uses the religion. The 
Ulama manipulate Islamic teaching to the advantage of undemocratic political leaders (Al-
Suwaidi 1995, pp.87-88) to defend also the law of God. This does not mean that there are no 
economic interests at stake in the conflicts between schools that are often grafted onto inter-clan 
conflicts over to obtain the rent (Platteau 2006, p. 14); it means that we should not interpret 
history solely from the perspective of instrumental rationality. We must leave room for axiological 
rationality in our reading of social phenomena. Secondly, Islam is a total religion, where man is 
above all else a Muslim. Whether he is a simple trader or a governor, there is no dissociation in 
his personality. He is a Muslim before being a trader, ruler or soldier. The main consequence of 
this conclusion is that formal institutions do not have primacy over informal ones, but that 
informal institutions, culture and its religious dimension, interact with the formal institutions and, 
5
 A survey into 14 Muslim countries showed that the inhabitants of these countries generally felt that Islam 
was under threat. (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2003, p. 46). 
François Facchini, 1° Workshop of the European Network on the Economics of Religion (ENER)  
in Granada, Spain, 16 – 17 November 2007 JEL Classification : KOO, N23 
   
ultimately, with individual behaviours and their interest for the creation of wealth. Economic 
development does indeed represent a change in mentalities (Colombatto 2001, Pejovich 1994), 
but this evolution in mental models occurs within institutions. So, as Hayek theorised in Law, 
Legislation and Liberty, the human mind (mentality) is as much the product of the social 
environment in which in turn acts on these institutions and modifies them. Our article thus joins 
in the controversy about the theory of institutional changes, defending the thesis that the forceful 
introduction of market institutions (capitalism by fiat, private property by fiat) is not enough, on its 
own, to achieve the hoped- for results. Each nation has its own specific moral path to follow, and 
the use of force only slows down the process of identification of the right institutions, initiated by 
political entrepreneur or entrepreneur in institution. 
 
This thesis does not say, nevertheless, that Islam and religiousness in general are incompatible 
with the spread of commercial relations and the protection of property rights. Mises (1981, 
pp.386 – 387) wrote, “just as in the case of Eastern religions, Christianity must either either 
overcome Capitalism or go under”. The thesis of incompatibility gave rise to Ataturk’s policy of 
secularisation in Turkey. In the end, this was a matter of taking the path followed by countries 
like Japan, or the five dragons of South-East Asia, to make a partial break with Islam in order to 
bring the Muslim world into the modern era, in other words into a secularised world. We can 
address a lot of critics at this hypothesis. It is a more or less elaborate form of social 
determinism. Everything comes down to the standard of living. Rises in income provoke a break 
with the traditional values of security and protection and encourage values of personal fulfilment 
and freedom. Normally, the countries of the Muslim world should modernise and adopt the paths 
of democracy as they grow richer. However, this thesis is contradicted by two facts. The first is 
the religiousness of the Americans. The second has been the object of an article by Martin 
Paldam (2008). Muslim countries and Arab countries in particular are growing richer. Their levels 
of income are rising, but their values remain traditional and hostile to modernity (Paldam 2008). 
To explain this fact, Paldam starts by advancing the idea that oil exports enable these countries 
to get richer without having to modify their values or question their traditions. To support his 
argument, he observes that the countries with sizeable natural resources (notably in oil) are 
generally less democratic than countries of equivalent levels of wealth but poor in natural 
resources. This explanation can be challenged by pointing out that democracy was born in 
Europe in countries that did not necessarily, at the time, have a standard of living any higher 
than those observed in many developing countries today. Indeed, one can perceive, in Paldam’s 
argument, the weaknesses of reasoning that is founded not only on recent quantitative history 
without any longer-term perspective, but also on the idea that what has been, will be. 
 
By ruling out the thesis of secularisation, we dissociate ourselves, naturally, from the thesis of 
incompatibility, and advance the idea that religiousness and Islam are not opposed to economic 
development. Our first idea is sustained by Berger’s thesis (1993). The guiding light of economic 
development is the market entrepreneur, who operates within a subculture present in many 
societies that have not been in contact with each other. The constituent elements of the 
productive activity of entrepreneurs transcend the differences between societies or epochs 
(Berger 1993, p. 7). Our second argument is that Islamic law can evolve. Its story shows that is 
possible (Coulson 1964, Schacht 1964, 1999). If the Ulama can manipulated the Islamic 
teaching and to provoke an interpretative turn, then we can think economic freedom in an 
Islamic context. This interpretative turn will be possible because in Islamic law, “out of the  600 
verses of the Koran, the large majority deal with religious duties and the ritual practices of 
prayer, fasting and pilgrimage. No more than about eighty verses deal with strictly legal 
questions” (Coulson 1964, 1995, p. 14). This means that apart from a few very precise rules, the 
Koran is essentially composed of general verses (Ragab 1980, p. 514) and that the heart of 
Islam is spiritual. Nevertheless, Ulama manipulate in institutional path dependency. The 
liberalization will make without secularisation. To defend this position we can recall that the heart 
of the conflict between Islam and the Western model of secularised development does not lie in 
property law but in family law and criminal law. These domains of law touch human right, but 
they do not directly involve commercial trade. The British were confronted with this problem 
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during the colonisation of Nigeria, as Alhadji Bouba Nouhou points out (2005, p. 119). It is in the 
domain of criminal law that the Sharia is applied most. The conflicts that arose during British 
colonisation were centred more on reprisals in the case of death, for example, (the level of 
punishment) than on questions of property, the latter being governed more by the customs and 
legal traditions of each country than by the sacred texts. Likewise, the conflict between East and 
West, today, is not over economic questions, but over spiritual questions such as the place of 
God in society or questions of mores, such as homosexuality, gender inequality, polygamy, 
Ramadan, apostasy or the role of religion in the constitution or in education (secular model). The 
main problem for economic development is not to protect political liberty (democracy), but to 
respect private property right. If we are right, the necessary conditions for an Islamic model of 
development can be attained. It is possible for a society to be conservative in its values and still 
accept the efficiency and rationalisation of the market. Indeed, the American model is not so 
very different from this situation. 
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